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PROTECTION OF SPORTS TRADEMARKS
I. INTRODUCrION
The major professional sports leagues and teams, major college sports
powers, and other sports organizations, such as the United States Olympic
Committee, the Professional Golfers Association, and the United States
Tennis Association, each use trademarks on items manufactured for sale.!
The four major sports leagues in the United States, the National Basketball
Association, the National Football League, the National Hockey League,
and Major League Baseball, each have a branch which acts as the exclusive
licensing agent for the registered and common law trademarks of the
member clubs.2 Logos and symbols of these sports teams have turned into
a $3 billion market.' Royalties from licensing range from six to eight
percent of that amount
For example, National Football League Properties, Inc. ("NFLP") is
a California corporation jointly owned by the twenty-eight member clubs
of the National Football League ("NFL"). Each of the member clubs grants
an exclusive license to NFLP to act as a licensing agent for the trademarks
and other commercial identifications of the member clubs. For a royalty
fee of six and one half percent of all net sales of licensed products, NFLP
issues licenses to manufacturers to produce merchandise bearing the NFL
member club's trademarks.5 The NFL's sales were estimated at $600
million in 1989, of which approximately $39 million went to the league as
royalties.
6
NFLP also maintains a quality control program to monitor the quality
and appearance of its licensees' merchandise. In addition, NFLP provides
1. Glenn M. Wong, Recent Trademark Law Cases Involving Professional and Intercollegiate
Sports, 1986 Dsr. C.L. REV. 87, 88 (1986).
2. See GREGORY J. BATrERSBY & CHARLES W. GRIMES, 1985 LICENSING LAW HANDBOOK
(1985); GREGORY J. BATrERSBY & CHARLES W. GRIMES, THE LAw OF MERcHANDIsE AND
CHARACTER LICENSING (1985).
3. Gerald Eskenazi, Sports Logos Become Symbols of Big Profits, N.Y. TIMES, June 19,
1989, at Al.
4. Id.
5. National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp.
651, 655 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
6. Eskenazi, supra note 3, at Al.
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trademark protection through investigating claims of infringement and
taking appropriate action to protect the trademarks, such as litigation and
settlement.7
The creation of the licensing arms of the major sports leagues
indicates that sports teams object to the unconsented use of their trade-
marked logos, particularly when the use is disparaging. Some television
and movie producers, as well as some merchandising producers, believe
that they may use the logos without the permission of the sports teams.
The producers rely on the doctrine of functionality as legal support for such
unauthorized use.' In contrast, sports organizations rely on the Lanham
Act? (federal protection) and state anti-dilution statutes in order to assert
control and seek protection of their trademarks.
This Comment analyzes the extent of control that a sports organization
should be able to exert over the use of its trademarked logo/symbol. The
issue addressed is whether the trademark owner should be permitted to
have a monopoly in the name of its famous trademark. 10 This Comment
contends that sports organizations should have extensive control over their
marks in order to protect their investment in establishing the mark and that
California's anti-dilution statute should be amended to eliminate the
ambiguities and allow broad protection for sports organizations.
II. FEDERAL TRADEMARK PROTECTION
Federal trademark protection is one of the most commonly used forms
of protection for sports organizations in safeguarding their properties."
The Lanham Act provides various substantive and procedural advantages
for registered as well as unregistered common law trademarks. The
duration of trademark protection is potentially unlimited. Protection
remains for the duration of the owner's continued use of the mark in
commerce. 12
Under the Lanham Act, protectable trademarks are defined as "any
word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof... used by a
7. Wichita, 532 F. Supp. at 655; see also National Football League Properties, Inc. v.
Consumer Enters., Inc., 327 N.E.2d 242 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975); National Football League Properties,
Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 327 N.E.2d 247 (Ii. App. Ct. 1975).
8. See infra part II.B.
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-72, 1091-96, 1111-21, 1123-27 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
10. While there are First Amendment considerations involved with protecting sports
trademarks, a First Amendment analysis is beyond the scope of this Comment.
11. See generally Gregory J. Battersby & Charles W. Grimes, Merchandising Revisited, 76
TRDMLARK REP. 271, 281 (1986).
12. Lanham Act § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 1059 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
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person.., to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique
product, from those manufactured or sold by others to indicate the source
of the goods .... '3 Service marks are defined as "any word, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof... [used] to identify and
distinguish the services of one person, including a unique service, from the
services of others and to indicate the source of the services . ..."
The Lanham Act provides two substantive provisions relating to the
protection of trademarks. Federally registered marks are protected under
§ 32(a) which provides:
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant...
use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or
colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the
sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods
or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive ... shall be
liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies
hereinafter provided. 15
Section 43(a) provides for protection of unregistered marks by stating:
(a)(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods
or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any
word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact,
which -
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of
such person with another person, or as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person...
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that
he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
16
13. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
14. Id.
15. Lanham Act § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
16. Lanham Act § 43, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
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A. Protecting Sports Organizations
Trademarks - The Likelihood of Confusion
The central inquiry of an infringement action under either § 32(a) or
§ 43(a) of the Lanham Act is whether there exists a likelihood of
confusion. In determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion, all
of the federal circuit courts apply a test based on the eight factor test
established in Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp.:7 (1) the strength
of the mark; (2) the degree of similarity between the two marks; (3) the
proximity of the products; (4) the likelihood that the prior owner will
bridge the gap; (5) actual confusion; (6) the defendant's good faith in
adopting the mark; (7) the quality of defendant's product or service; and (8)
the sophistication of the buyers. These eight Polaroid factors, however, do
not exhaust the factors that a court may consider in determining the
likelihood of confusion. 8 Courts may take other considerations into
account such as the size of the plaintiff's investment, the expectations of
the public, the plaintiff's treatment of its own mark, the methods by which
the products are advertised, the geographical distribution of the products,
and the similarity in appearance of the products. 9
1. Boston Hockey - An Initial Sports Trademark Case
One of the first sports merchandising/promotional goods cases to
reach a federal circuit court was Boston Professional Hockey Association
v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Manufacturing." The National Hockey League
("NHL") and thirteen of its member hockey teams sought to enjoin the
defendant from manufacturing and selling patches which depicted NHL
trademarks. The NHL had authorized NHL Services ("NHLS") as its
exclusive licensing agent. NHLS thus licensed to various manufacturers the
right to use the team symbols on various merchandise. NHLS had granted
Lion Brothers Company an exclusive license to manufacture such
embroidered emblems. Dallas Cap & Emblem Manufacturing unsuccess-
17. 287 F.2d 492,495 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961). See also Peter E. Mims,
Note, Promotional Goods and the Functionality Doctrine: An Economic Model of Trademarks,
63 TEx. L. REV. 639, 643-44 n.15 (1984).
18. Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 495.
19. See generally 1 JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTEION AND PRACTICE § 5.01-5.09
(1994).
20. 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975).
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fully sought such a license from N-LS, then they manufactured and sold
such emblems without permission.2
The Fifth Circuit framed the issue as whether "the unauthorized,
intentional duplication of a professional hockey team's symbol on an
embroidered emblem, to be sold to the public as a patch for attachment to
clothing, violates any legal right of the team to the exclusive use of that
symbol." 22 The court reversed the district court's finding that there was
no likelihood of confusion. The Fifth Circuit found that the team had an
interest in its own individualized symbol and was entitled to legal
protection against such unauthorized duplication.' 3  The confusion
requirement was met since "the defendant duplicated the protected
trademarks and sold them to the public knowing that the public would
identify them as being the teams' trademarks. The certain knowledge of
the buyer that the source and origin of the trademark symbols were in [the]
plaintiffs satisfies the requirement of the act."24
2. NFLP v. Consumer Enterprises, Inc. -
Protection of NFL Team Symbols
The court in National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Consumer
Enterprises, Inc.'5 dealt with the same issue presented in Boston Hockey
regarding the unlicensed sale of embroidered patches of NFL team
symbols.2 6 The court recognized that the plaintiffs had a property right
in the team symbols, which entitled them to protection. This right accrued
as a result of the teams acquiring goodwill and a strong secondary meaning
in their marks. 7 Because the NFL teams and their symbols had acquired
21. I. at 1009.
22. IL at 1008.
23. After the Boston Hockey opinion, most commentators supported the protection of
trademarks on promotional goods. See Anthony L. Fletcher, The Trademark Forum: Still More
About Patches, 67 TRADEMARK REP. 76, 84 (1977); Frank P. Presta, The Boston Professional
Hockey Association Case and Related Cases - A Step in the Right Direction, 66 TRADEMARK
REP. 131 (1976); John Paul Reiner, Those Unraveling Sports Patches Again - Or, Please Do Not
Embroider Without the Survey Evidence, 67 TRADEMARK REP. 318 (1977). The one exception
to these articles of approval was an article written by counsel for the defendant in Boston Hockey.
See Charles A. Laff & Larry L. Saret, Further Unraveling of Sears-Compco: Of Patches, Paladin
and Laurel and Hardy, 66 TRADEMARK REP. 427, 442-43 (1976).
24. Boston Hockey, 510 F.2d at 1012.
25. 327 N.E.2d 242 (I1. App. Ct. 1975).
26. Id. at 245; see also National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem
Mfg., Inc., 327 N.E.2d 247 (111. App. Ct. 1975) (companion case to Consumer Enterprises).
27. Consumer Enters., Inc., 327 N.E.2d at 245. The term secondary meaning has been
interpreted by the Supreme Court as establishing "in the minds of the public, the primary
significance of a product feature or term is to identify the source of the product rather than the
19951
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popularity and notoriety through extensive licensing arrangements made by
NFLP, the court found that the defendant's duplication of the trademarks
would cause consumers to associate the patches with the NFL and its
teams. The defendant contended that "no trademark infringement has
occurred because the emblems are merely decorative ornaments and do not
identify sponsorship by plaintiff or the NFL or the member clubs."28 The
court rejected this argument and noted that:
[D]efendant is in the business of manufacturing and selling
embroidered emblems; it can place any design it wishes on the
emblems. However, it has chosen to copy the marks of the NFL
teams because they are very distinctive and are associated with
highly successful football teams. Therefore, we conclude that
the trademarks of the teams copied by defendant indicate
sponsorship or origin in addition to their ornamental value.29
3. Dallas Cowboys v. Pussycat Cinema - Protecting
a Sports Trademark's Reputation
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.,30
provides strong support for sports organizations in exercising tight control
over their trademarks. In that case, the plaintiff asserted that it had a
trademark in its uniform, and that the defendants infringed and diluted the
value of that mark by advertising and exhibiting unauthorized copies of
plaintiff's uniform in the movie "Debbie Does Dallas." After the court
found that the plaintiff had a trademark in its uniform,31 the issue was
whether the defendants' depiction of the uniform in the movie violated the
trademark. The court found that the uniform worn in the movie was almost
identical to the plaintiff's uniform. The defendants contended, however,
that despite that similarity, the public is unlikely to be confused within the
meaning of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.32
According to the defendants, the Lanham Act requires confusion as
to the origin of the film.33 Thus, the defendants asserted that they did not
product itself." Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982). The prime
element of secondary meaning is "a mental association in buyers' minds between the alleged mark
and a single source of the product." 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 15.02[1], at 15-8 (3d ed. 1994).
28. Consumer Enters., Inc., 327 N.E.2d at 246.
29. Id. at 246-47.
30. 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
31. See infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
32. Dallas Cowboys, 604 F.2d at 204.
33. ld.
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infringe plaintiff's mark because no reasonable person would believe that
"Debbie Does Dallas" originated with the plaintiff.' The court found
defendants' confusion standard too narrow and went on to hold:
In order to be confused, a consumer need not believe that the
owner of the mark actually produced the item and placed it on
the market. The public's belief that the mark's owner spon-
sored or otherwise approved the use of the trademark satisfies
the confusion requirement. In the instant case, the uniform
depicted in "Debbie Does Dallas" unquestionably brings to mind
the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders. Indeed, it is hard to believe
that anyone who had seen defendants' sexually depraved film
could ever thereafter disassociate it from plaintiff's cheerleaders.
This association results in confusion which has "a tendency to
impugn [plaintiff's services] and injure plaintiff's business
reputation.
' 35
The court found that the plaintiff had established a likelihood of
confusion. It also expanded the protection afforded to trademark owners
by asserting that "trademark laws are designed not only to prevent
consumer confusion but also to protect 'the synonymous right of a
trademark owner to control his product's reputation."' 3 6 Sports teams rely
on this ruling as protection against unconsented use by movie producers in
using similar costumes or logoed clothing/items.37 While the case does
lend support for such protection, the ruling of the case may have been
affected by the X-rated nature of the defendants' movie.
4. NFLP v. Wichita - Preventing Consumer Confusion
and Misappropriation of Goodwill
National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sports-
wear, Inc.,38 is another case which supports sports organizations' right to
control their trademarks. Plaintiff NFLP sought to enjoin defendant
Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc. from manufacturing and selling NFL football
jersey replicas. The replicas used the name of NFL teams or their
nicknames on the jersey. After finding secondary meaning in the marks of
34. Id.
35. Id. at 204-205 (citations omitted).
36. Id at 205 (quoting James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266,
274 (7th Cir. 1976)).
37. See generally Mins, supra note 17.
38. 532 F. Supp. 651 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
19951
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the NFL teams,39 the court examined whether a likelihood of confusion
existed. The court considered various factors including those of the
Polaroid test. The court found that the replicas were physically similar to
official NFL football jersey replicas, the goods were sold in similar
markets, and there was evidence of actual confusion.' In addition, the
court looked at the intent of the defendant and found that the defendant
intended to create confusion as to authorization or sponsorship. Wichita's
president, Mr. Cooke, "testified that he sold shirts with city names and
team nicknames to NFL fans who wished to support a particular member
club."41 In addition, the defendant continued to manufacture and sell its
product after NFLP informed the defendant that such conduct constituted
infringement.42
The court, in finding that the defendant deliberately intended to
manufacture its products to resemble official replicas, also found that the
defendant intended to appropriate the goodwill and reputation of the
NFL.4 Such evidence, concluded the court, "reflects on Wichita's intent
to confuse the public as to sponsorship." 44 Thus, the court found that the
defendant infringed on the plaintiff's rights as the trademark owner by
causing consumer confusion as to who produced the goods.
5. Federal Case Law Favors Protection of
Sports Organizations' Trademarks
An analysis of these cases demonstrates that sports teams can rely on
federal protection for their trademarks/logos. In order to utilize federal
protection, the team must demonstrate that the defendant's use creates a
likelihood of confusion. This requirement can be met by showing that the
public believed the trademark owner sponsored or approved the use of the
trademark/logo. While trademark law was established to protect the
interests of consumers, it also functions to protect trademark owners in
controlling a product's reputation. Thus, in various federal cases, sports
organizations have succeeded in preventing the unconsented use of their
marks/logos.
39. See infra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
40. Wichita, 532 F. Supp. at 659.
41. Id. at 661.
42. Id. at 661-62.
43. Id. at 662.
44. Id.
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B. Defense of Functionality Asserted by
Alleged Sports-Trademark Infringers
The defense of functionality can be used by defendants in a trademark
infringement case in an "attempt to escape the confines of the confusion
rationale."'45 Some products, because of extensive advertising, popularity,
novelty, or other causes, acquire a secondary meaning and a functional
feature. The Supreme Court, in Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives
Laboratories, Inc.47 stated, "[i]n general terms, a product feature is
functional if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects
the cost or quality of the article."48 If trademark law were to protect such
functional features, "the original producer would be able to establish a
monopoly in useful goods."'49 Thus, the functionality doctrine is intended
to protect consumers from such monopolies by allowing competitors to
copy the functional features of a product. Copying is allowed even if there
is secondary meaning, but not if the feature is protected by either a
copyright or a patent. The goals of the functionality doctrine are to allow
free competition and to prevent the creation of an exclusive monopolistic
right to market goods with features that are essential to the use or
efficiency of a product.5"
This doctrine has also been applied to aesthetic and utilitarian features
of a good. The Restatement of Torts states that "when goods are purchased
in part for their aesthetic qualities, features unrelated to the operation or
performance of a product may nevertheless be 'functional' in the sense that
a prohibition on imitation could substantially hinder competition."5' In
Pagliero v. Wallace China Co.,5 2 the Ninth Circuit refused to enjoin the
defendant's copying of four designs which appeared on the plaintiff's china.
The court found that the aesthetic design on the china was an essential
selling feature of the product and was thus functional. While some courts
45. Robert C. Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights: An Analysis of the Merchandising of
Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.C. L. REv. 603, 617 (1984).
46. Mims, supra note 17, at 644.
47. 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
48. Id. at 850 n.10.
49. Mims, supra note 17, at 644-45.
50. l. at 645.
51. Denicola, supra note 45, at 618 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 742 cmt. (a)
(1938)).
52. 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952).
1995]
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follow Pagliero, others, such as the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
have rejected it. 3
1. Vagueness of Trademark Law Produces Disparate Results
The disparate results, evidenced in the various cases dealing with
trademark protection for sports teams, are caused by the inherent vagueness
of trademark law.' The contrasting decisions of the various courts reflect
"the uncertain limits of protection for trademark owners in light of the
common-law doctrine of functionality."'55 In addition, the conflicting
results can be attributed to the difficulty of determining whether the
unconsented use creates a likelihood of confusion. 6
2. Boston Hockey - Broad Interpretation of Trademark Rights
and a Rejection of the Functionality Defense
In Boston Hockey, the defendants argued that plaintiff's marks were
functional and thus served no trademark purpose and that the concept of
free competition should remove the plaintiffs from the scope of protection
under the Lanham Act. 7 The court rejected the defendants' argument
since the symbols/patches sold bore the identifiable trademarks of the
plaintiffs. The court distinguished Pagliero in that the designs involved
were not trademarked, copyrighted, or patented, while in Boston Hockey the
embroidered symbols "are sold not because of any such aesthetic character-
istic but because they are the trademarks of the hockey teams."58 As a
result, the court enjoined defendants from copying the emblems. 9
3. Ninth Circuit Rejects Broad Trademark Protection
The Ninth Circuit, in International Order of Job's Daughters v.
Lindeburg and Co.,' ° rejected the broad trademark protection afforded in
Boston Hockey.6 The plaintiff, a young women's fraternal organization,
sought to enjoin the defendant from selling jewelry which bore the
53. Mims, supra note 17, at 646.
54. Id. at 639.
55. IL at 640.
56. Id.
57. Boston Hockey, 510 F.2d at 1013.
58. Id.
59. l at 1012.
60. 633 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1980). See infra part I.A.
61. Id. at 918.
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organization's insignia. The court, however, found that the name and
emblem of the organization are functional aesthetic components of the
jewelry since "they are being merchandised on the basis of their intrinsic
value, not as a designation of origin or sponsorship."62  The court went
on to state:
It is not uncommon for a name or emblem that serves in
one context as a collective mark or trademark also to be
merchandised for its own intrinsic utility to consumers. We
commonly identify ourselves by displaying emblems expressing
allegiances. Our jewelry, clothing, and cars are emblazoned
with inscriptions showing the organizations we belong to, the
schools we attend, the landmarks we have visited, the sports
teams we support, the beverages we imbibe. Although these
inscriptions frequently include names and emblems that are also
used as collective marks or trademarks, it would be naive to
conclude that the name or emblem is desired because consumers
believe that the product somehow originated with or was
sponsored by the organization the name or emblem signifies.63
The court rejected the broad interpretation in Boston Hockey that a
trademark's owner has a complete monopoly over all of its uses, including
its functional use.64 The court interpreted the Lanham Act and its
legislative history as granting a much narrower scope of protection to
trademark owners. The court found that the property right afforded to a
trademark owner should be limited to a right necessary to prevent consumer
confusion as to who produced the goods and to assist in the distinguishing
of the trademark owner's goods.65 However, the court recognized that a
name or emblem could be protected if it served simultaneously as a
functional component of a product and as a trademark.66 The court stated:
Our holding does not mean that a name or emblem could
not serve simultaneously as a functional component of a product
and a trademark. That is, even if the Job's Daughters' name and
emblem, when inscribed on Lindeburg's jewelry, served
primarily a functional purpose, it is possible that they could
62. Id.
63. Id. But see National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc.,
532 F. Supp. 651 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (finding survey evidence shows that a majority of potential
consumers believe that emblems and sportswear bearing team names and insignia are sponsored
by the NFL).
64. Job's Daughters, 633 F.2d at 918.
65. Id.
66. Id.
1995]
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serve secondarily as trademarks if the typical customer not only
purchased the jewelry for its intrinsic functional use and
aesthetic appeal but also inferred from the insignia that the
jewelry was produced, sponsored, or endorsed by Job's Daugh-
ters.
67
Thus, to prevail against aesthetic functionality, a plaintiff can show
secondary meaning and a likelihood of confusion. This concept greatly
"loosened the strict standard of 'aesthetic functionality' developed in the
Ninth Circuit in Pagliero and its progeny."
68
4. Sports Insignia as a Functional Characteristic of a Soft Good
In University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Products, Inc.,69 the
University of Pittsburgh ("Pitt") sued Champion to prevent Champion from
selling soft goods70 bearing the university's insignia. The court rejected
Pitt's claim on the ground that Pitt failed to show a likelihood of
confusion.7' Pitt did not introduce survey evidence which would
demonstrate "likelihood of consumer confusion as to source, origin,
authorization or sponsorship."72
The court also determined that "the Pitt insignia as used by Champion
are functional characteristics of the soft goods., 73 The use of Pitt's name
on the soft goods, according to the court, merely allows "the garment's
wearer to display his or her support for the school and its athletic
teams."'74 Such a use was found to be an aesthetic function and thus not
subject to an injunction. The goods could not perform this allegiance
function unless they bore the Pitt insignia. Therefore, the insignia is
essential to the use or purpose of the goods.75 The court emphasized that
"[t]here is no evidence [that proved] that the consumer cares who has made
the soft goods or whether they were made under license." 76 In addition,
the relief sought by Pitt would grant it a monopoly over its insignia, and
the court did not want to reach such a result.7
67. Id. at 919 (citation omitted).
68. Mins, supra note 17, at 655 n.82.
69. 566 F. Supp. 711 (W.D. Pa. 1983).
70. The term soft goods refers to garments such as sweatshirts and tee shirts.
71. University of Pittsburgh, 566 F. Supp. at 720.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 721.
75. Id.
76. University of Pittsburgh, 566 F. Supp. at 721.
77. Id.
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5. Sports Design Characterized as Non-Functional
In Dallas Cowboys, the defendants argued that the uniform worn by
the cheerleaders was a functional item necessary for performing cheerlead-
ing routines, and thus was not capable of becoming a trademark.78 The
court rejected this argument and found that plaintiff had a trademark in the
particular combination of colors and decoration which is used to distinguish
their uniform from other team's uniforms.79 The court stated "i]t is well
established that, if the design of an item is nonfunctional and has acquired
secondary meaning, the design may become a trademark even if the item
itself is functional.""° Since the uniform was also found to be an arbitrary
design, it was allowed to serve as a trademark. In addition, the court found
that the design of the uniform is not essential to the performance of a
cheerleading routine and thus was subject to protection."
National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sports-
wear, Inc.82 is another case in which a court rejected the doctrine of
aesthetic functionality in regard to design features whose appeal rests on
the associations they conjure.8 3 The defendant argued that the plaintiff's
marks were functional and thus not subject to trademark status. According
to the defendant, the descriptive terms used on an NFL football jersey
replica are crucial components of the good. No consumer would purchase
a replica unless it had the descriptive terms relating the jersey to the NFL
team. The court rejected this argument by citing Keene Corp. v. Paraflex
Industries, Inc.' as holding that "[a]n attractive feature is not per se
functional."' 5 The court also cited the simultaneous standard of function-
ality and trademark in Job's Daughters, and found that the marks at issue
had attained secondary meaning and consumers were likely to be con-
fused.86 Thus, the court issued an injunction against the defendant.8
78. Dallas Cowboys, 604 F.2d at 203. See supra part II.A.3.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. l
82. 532 F. Supp. 651 (W.D. Wash. 1982). See supra part II.A.4.
83. Id.
84. 653 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1981).
85. Wichita, 532 F. Supp. at 662.
86. Id. at 663.
87. Id. at 662.
1995]
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6. Proposed Limit on Functionality - Utilitarian Uses
If a sports team's logo/symbol indicates a source or represents an
affiliation and does not contribute to the operational utility of a product, it
should be granted trademark protection.88 The court in Keene Corp. v.
Paraflex Industries, Inc. recognized a fault in the doctrine of aesthetic
functionality in that "it provides a disincentive for development of
imaginative and attractive design. The more appealing the design, the less
protection it would receive."89 The concept of functionality should thus
be limited to utilitarian uses. According to Joseph P. Bauer:
It is only when the symbol or feature for which protection is
sought has a utilitarian function - it enhances the operational
utility, rather than the mere desirability (or 'sales utility'), of the
product - that the interests in enhanced competition are
sufficiently implicated so that trademark protection ought to
yield. When the symbol or feature has no such function, a
second person should be prohibited from copying the product.'
C. Use of Survey Evidence
As seen from an analysis of these cases dealing with the concept of
functionality and the likelihood of confusion, the trademark owner usually
prevailed when he was able to introduce some evidence of consumer
confusion. In the cases in which the defendant prevailed under the doctrine
of functionality, the plaintiff had failed to establish a likelihood of
confusion. Surveys can indicate that a significant proportion of the relevant
consumer population think there is a direct connection between the goods
with a logo/symbol and the teams or institutions associated with the
logo/symbol. For example, the NFL has successfully and consistently
introduced survey evidence to show that a "majority of potential consumers
believe that emblems and sportswear bearing team names and insignia are
sponsored by the NFL."91
In National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita, 9 the NFL
conducted a survey which asked people who had only seen official jerseys
whether they believed the company that produced the jersey had to obtain
88. See Joseph P. Bauer, A Federal Law of Unfair Competition: What Should be the Reach
of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act?, 31 UCLA L. REV. 671, 724 (1984).
89. Keene Corp., 635 F.2d at 825.
90. Bauer, supra note 88, at 728.
91. Denicola, supra note 45, at 611-612.
92. 532 F. Supp. 651 (W.D. Wash. 1982). See supra part lI.A.4.
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authorization/permission to make it. If the interviewee answered that
authorization was required, he was then asked from whom he thought
authorization was obtained.93 Approximately 50% of the interviewees
believed that the manufacturer was required to obtain authorization from
the NFL or one of the teams in order to manufacture the jerseys.'
Another such survey was conducted in which interviewees were shown one
of defendant's jerseys and asked if they believed authorization was required
in order to manufacture the jersey.95 Again, approximately 50% of the
interviewees believed that NFL or team authorization was required.96 In
addition, the NFL introduced evidence of an actual purchaser of the
defendant's jersey who assumed that the defendant's product was
licensed. 97 The court relied on this evidence in finding a likelihood of
confusion, and thus enjoined the defendant. 98
III. STATE ANTI-DILuTIoN LAW
A. Advantage to Sports Organizations - Avoiding a
Showing of a Likelihood of Confusion
One of the drawbacks for sports organizations in using the Lanham
Act to protect logos/trademarks is that the Act requires a showing that
consumers are likely to be confused by the offending use of the trademark.
The analysis of the cases in the preceding section demonstrates that the
courts have been inconsistent in their application of the law in regard to
finding a likelihood of confusion. Thus, sports organizations also rely on
state anti-dilution statutes which protect against the diminution of the
marketing value of trademarks. 99 These anti-dilution statutes do not
require a showing of a likelihood of confusion and thus have the potential
for granting broad property rights in a trademark to its owner.' °°
93. Il at 659.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 661.
96. Id.
97. Wichita, 532 F. Supp. at 660.
98. Id. at 660-662.
99. David S. Welkowitz, Reexamining Trademark Dilution, 44 VANi. L. REV. 531, 532
(1991).
100. Id.
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Anti-dilution statutes are concerned with the loss or dilution of a
symbol's distinctiveness.' A famous mark's value accrues from its
ability to form an association in the mind of the consumer with a particular
product or producer. This association is in jeopardy, even absent
confusion, if another producer, adopts the mark for its products.'t 2
Anti-dilution statutes protect famous marks by prohibiting others from
using them and thus diluting their distinctiveness.
Likelihood of injury to business reputation is also protected by
anti-dilution statutes. 3 Courts have used the statutes to protect against
tarnishment of famous marks."° For instance, courts protect against the
unauthorized use of a famous mark on a poor quality product. Such
unauthorized use tarnishes the goodwill that the true owner has developed,
despite the consumer's knowledge that the product is not sponsored or
authorized by the trademark owner.
According to Frank Schechter, the first proponent of protecting the
mark's selling power under such anti-dilution theory:
The real injury in all such cases can only be gauged in the light
of what has been said concerning the function of a trademark.
It is the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and
hold upon the public mind of the mark or name by its use upon
non-competing goods. The more distinctive or unique the mark,
the deeper is its impress upon the public consciousness, and the
greater its need for protection against vitiation or dissociation
from the particular product in connection with which it has been
used. 05
As an effort to protect the interests of trademark owners, twenty-four states
have passed anti-dilution statutes."°
B. California's Anti-Dilution Statute
California protects against dilution in Article 12 of its Business and
Professions Code. Section 14330 provides:
101. See 1 JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACrIcE § 5.05[9], at 5-90
(1994).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Frank Scheehter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813,
825 (1927).
106. Welkowitz, supra note 99, at 536.
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(a) Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of
dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark registered under this
chapter, or a mark valid at common law, or a trade name valid
at common law, shall be a ground for injunctive relief notwith-
standing the absence of competition between the parties or the
absence of confusion as to the source of goods or services."°
Section 14335 provides:
(a) Any person who uses or unlawfully infringes upon a
mark registered under this chapter or under Title 15 of the
United States Code, other than in an otherwise noninfringing
manner, either on the person's own goods or services or to
describe the person's own goods or services, irrespective of
whether the mark is used primarily as an ornament, decoration,
garnishment, or embellishment on or in products, merchandise,
or goods, for the purpose of enhancing the commercial value of,
or selling or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise,
goods, or services, without prior consent of the owner of the
mark, shall be subject to an injunction against that use by the
owner of the mark.
(b) Nothing in subdivision (a) shall be construed to prohibit
comparative advertising.
(c) For the purposes of this section, the term "comparative
advertising" means the use of a competitor's trademark in
advertising to compare the relative qualities of the competitive
goods."08
1. Ambiguity and Breadth of the Statute
Sports organizations and other trademark owners argue that these
statutes should be interpreted broadly so that injunctive relief would be
available for almost all collateral uses of a mark, including ornamental
uses. 1°9 The statute extends trademark rights beyond the federal level of
protection by not requiring, as an element of infringement, the likelihood
of consumer confusion. In its present form, the statute is ambiguous as to
what extent of protection is actually afforded to trademark owners. It
exempts unauthorized uses of a mark "in an otherwise noninfringing
107. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 14330 (West 1987 & Supp 1995).
108. Id. § 14335.
109. See Bill Ainsworth, Dodgers Fighting Off Pitch to Bench State Trademark Law, THE
REcoRDER, June 3, 1993, at 8.
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manner;" yet "noninfringing" is not defined. Thus, it is left to the courts
and attorneys to interpret the definition of noninfringing."0
a. Statute is Poorly Written and thus Irrelevant?
In Plasticolor Molded Products v. Ford Motor Co., the court
interpreted the statute and found that the law was "so poorly written [that]
it was irrelevant. ' ' l" 2 Judge Kozinski found, "[i]n attempting to satisfy
both sides, the legislature added language that nullified the language
already there. By trying to say everything, the legislature succeeded in
saying nothing at all." 3 Under this ruling, ornamental use of a mark is
not considered an infringement and thus not subject to an injunction.
b. Is the Statute too Dangerous in Extending
an Owner's Rights and Privileges?
In spite of the interpretation in Plasticolor, the California State Bar
feels that the statute is too dangerous and should be repealed. They
contend that section 14335 extends rights and privileges to trademark
owners which far surpasses the rights previously granted under state and
federal law.1 4 The California State Bar argues that the statute gives
California's trademark owners an "in gross" right to their mark without a
need to show a likelihood of a negative impact on the mark."' While
federal law requires a showing of an element of consumer confusion and
section 14330 requires a likelihood of damage to business reputation or
mark uniqueness, section 14335 has no comparable standard. It only
requires that the mark be used to enhance the marketability or commercial
value of the non-owner's product. Thus the California State Bar contends
that the statute allows owners to extract licensing fees unfairly."
6
110. Infringement of Trademarks: Injunctive Relief. Hearings on S. 254 Before the Senate
Comm. on Judiciary, Regular Sess. 3 (1993-94).
111. 713 F. Supp. 1329 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
112. Ainsworth, supra note 109, at 8.
113. Plasticolor, 713 F. Supp. at 1348.
114. Infringement of Trademarks: Injunctive Relief: Hearings on S. 254 Before the Senate
Comm. on Judiciary, Regular Sess. 2 (1993-94).
115. Id.
116. Ainsworth, supra note 109, at 8.
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c. Does the Statute Set a Dangerous Precedent?
The California State Bar further contends that the law sets a
dangerous precedent. If the statute were interpreted broadly, section 14335
could allow for a "'near monopoly' over words, symbols, product
configurations .and containers, beyond any situation in which there is
consumer confusion or dilution of a mark... 7 They contend that such a
broad interpretation would allow for an injunction against the following:
(a) "United" brand toothpicks, which could be enjoined by
"United" Airlines;
(b) Software that is advertised to operate on "IBM or IBM-
compatible computers";
(c) How to manuals, e.g., "How to Use WordPerfect";
(d) Advertisements or signs by an independent repair shop
indicating that the shop "repairs VWs, Porches, and Audis";...
(f) The mere mention or incidental depiction of a trademark or
trademarked product in a book, movie, painting, photograph, or
music video.
118
Because of the ambiguity and possibility for such great control for
trademark owners under section 14335, the California State Bar, the San
Francisco Patent and Trademark Law Association, and the Los Angeles
County Intellectual Property and Entertainment Law Section are seeking the
repeal of the statute. 9
2. California Sports Organizations Maintain the Statute is Essential
The California sports organizations, including the Lakers, Clippers,
and Dodgers contend that the law is necessary to protect their team's logos
and images. Dodgers' general counsel Santiago Fernandez asserts that the
statute's intent is clear in that it means "that ornamental use requires
consent."'2 Fernandez further avers that sports teams spend substantial
amounts of time, effort, and money in protecting their good image and do
not desire to have others "take advantage of that goodwill through the
117. Infringement of Trademarks: Injunctive Relief. Hearings on S. 254 Before the Senate
Comm. on Judiciary, Regular Sess. 3 (1993-94).
118. Id,
119. Ainsworth, supra note 109, at 8.
120. Id.
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'incidental or ornamental' use of their teams' trademarks without the teams'
permission."''
a. Statute Protects Sports Teams Image and Prevents
Unjust Enrichment by an Infringer
James Perzik, the Los Angeles Lakers' general counsel, asserts that
the law allows sports teams to protect their image and ensure that others do
not unfairly profit from the use of their logo." Perzik argues that "[tihe
only reason someone would want to use the Lakers' logo.., is because of
the goodwill the team has generated. ... [I]t would be unfair to allow
someone else to profit from the Lakers' efforts."'" He also asserts that
the law provides the sports teams with a necessary image control. Perzik
feels the law supports his argument that "[i]f a character in a play is a
Laker who is a mass murderer, I want to be able to keep the Lakers out of
the play."124
b. Statute Assists Sports Teams and Movie Studios
in Maintaining Cordial Relations
According to the Dodgers' general counsel, the statute has helped the
Dodgers maintain cordial relationships with movie studios."z The studios
have consistently complied with the Dodgers' wishes regarding the use of
their logo.'26 They have either taken the Dodger trademark out of their
films or paid the Dodgers a nominal licensing fee to use their logo. For
example, the producers of the movie "Down and Out in Beverly Hills"
asked the Dodgers their opinion over dialogue in the movie that mentioned
the team. The Dodgers' general counsel, Fernandez, asked the studio to
delete the obscene language contained in the dialogue. 27
In the movie "Grand Canyon," one of the main characters, played by
Danny Glover, was supposed to wear a Dodgers hat, but instead wore a
New York Mets hat. The Dodgers convinced the filmmaker not to use its
hat because the team considered the film too violent.'28 The Dodgers
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Ainsworth, supra note 109, at 8.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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were also successful in preventing the Dodgers logo from being used on a
hat in an advertisement of the movie "Water."' 29
As these examples demonstrate, the California sports teams have been
successful in preventing ornamental use of their logos by relying on the
protection afforded in section 14335. Intellectual property lawyers contend
that the statute's ambiguity gives the sports teams the advantage. 3'
Patricia Thayer, co-head of the intellectual property section at Howard,
Rice, Nemevroski, Canady, Robertson & Falk contends that "[w]hen you
have a large and well-financed organization, just by holding up the law,
you can get people to capitulate.'
3'
3. Amendment Must Be Implemented to Clarify
the Ambiguity of the Statute
a. Senator Kopp's Proposed Amendment
An attempt to repeal section 14335 failed in the 1993 California
legislative session. Subsequently, Senator Kopp introduced an amendment
to clarify the section:
Any person who uses, or unlawfully infringes upon, a
professional sports insignia that is a mark registered under this
chapter or under Title 15 of the United States Code, on the
person's own goods or services where that mark identifies the
goods on which the mark is affixed or the person's own services
with the owner of the registered mark, for the purpose of
enhancing the commercial value of the goods or services, in the
sale or solicitation for purchase of, the person's products,
merchandise, goods, or services, without prior consent of the
owner of the mark, shall be subject to an injunction against that
use by the owner of the mark. This section applies irrespective
of whether the mark is used primarily as an ornament, decora-
tion, garnishment, or embellishment on or in products, mer-
chandise, goods, or in connection with services.'
The amendment thus clarifies the statute so that it only applies to
owners of professional sports insignia. It also limits the granting of
129. See Lionel S. Sobel, Santiago Fernandez: The LA. Dodgers' Clubhouse Lawyer, L.A.
LAWYER, Oct. 1985, at 20.
130. Ainsworth, supra note 109, at 1.
131. Id. at 8.
132. CAL. LEGIS. COUNS. Dia. 254 (Feb. 10, 1993).
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injunctions to those cases in which the mark is used to enhance the
salability of another party's product or service. Additionally, the use of the
mark must also serve to identify the other party's goods or services with
the sports insignia or logo. The amendment also decreases the ambiguity
of the original statute by deleting the language "otherwise noninfringing
manner."
b. Dodgers' Proposed Changes to the Statute
While such an amendment appears to be a vast improvement over the
original statute, the Dodgers have suggested another alternative. The
Dodgers also seek to eliminate the language "otherwise noninfringing
manner" and limit section 14335 to owners of professional sports teams
marks. 133 In contrast to the above amendment, the Dodgers do not want
to limit injunctive relief to cases in which the other party must attempt to
identify with the sports insignia." 4 Such an amendment would grant
sports organizations a clearer means of protection against all unconsented
use, including ornamental or incidental, so long as the other party's use was
for the purpose of enhancing the commercial value or salability of the
user's product.
135
c. Senator Kopp's Amendment Should be Implemented
Section 14335 should be amended to protect sports organizations.
Currently section 14335 is ambiguous as to the scope of its protection, and
thus the "otherwise noninfringing" exception should be deleted. Senator
Kopp's proposed amendment eliminates the existing ambiguity of the
statute by limiting protection to instances in which the infringing use is for
the purpose of enhancing the commercial value of the goods or services.
In addition, his proposed amendment requires that the infringing use of the
mark serves to identify with the actual goods or services of the owner's
mark. His amendment would also retain the exception for use of a mark
in comparative advertising. Thus, Senator Kopp's amendment should be
passed to protect professional sports insignia and trademarks. 36 Such an
133. Infringement of Trademarks: Injunctive Relief. Hearings on S. 254 Before the Senate
Comm. on Judiciary, Regular Sess. 4 (1993-94).
134. Id. at 5.
135. Id.
136. Whether Senator Kopp's amendment should be expanded to include protection beyond
sports teams is beyond the scope of this Comment. Under the current statute, all registered marks
are protected. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14335 (West 1987 & Supp. 1995) (protection is
afforded to marks registered under this code or under Title 15 of the United States Code).
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amendment will allow for broad protection of trademarks and logos of
sports organizations and others, but that protection will be adequately and
clearly limited by the above proposals.
B. Disadvantages of Using Dilution Statutes
While states have passed statutes to protect trademark owners, the
courts "have often limited the effectiveness of these statutes through
restrictive interpretations. ' 137  Courts may be reluctant to protect the
property interest of the trademark owners. Since traditional trademark law
focuses on consumer interests, judges often decide dilution cases based on
the likelihood of confusion and the danger of monopoly if the junior user
were enjoined. 3  However, dilution cases are not based on the likelihood
of consumer confusion, and thus trademark owners are likely to lose their
cases based on such strict judicial interpretation. Another problem is that
less than half of the states in the United States have dilution statutes.
Those states that do have dilution statutes have different provisions, though
most are based on the Model Trademark Bill. Thus, it is difficult for a
sports organization to have a uniform means of dilution protection
throughout the United States. Nonetheless, in states that do provide strong
anti-dilution statutes, such as California, a trademark owner has a powerful
means, in addition to federal trademark law, to exert control over his
trademarks.
IV. ECONoMIc ANALYSIS
A. Appropriateness of Analysis
An economic analysis of the control that a sports organization should
be able to exert over its trademark/logo is appropriate because Congress
passed the Lanham Act in an effort to promote orderly and efficient
commerce. 39 The Senate Report on the Lanham Act considered trade-
marks as the "'essence of competition' because they facilitate consumer
choice without fostering monopoly."'" The Senate Report evidenced
Congress' concern with the misappropriation of the goodwill of trademark
owners by stating, "where the owner of a trade-mark has spent energy,
137. Mins, supra note 17, at 650.
138. Id. at 651.
139. Id. at 656.
140. Id.
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time, and money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in
his investment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats."''
Congress, in passing the Lanham Act, examined the economic impact the
Act would have on both the interests of consumers and trademark owners.
B. Should Sports Trademark Owners be Granted
an Exclusive Monopoly?
1. An Argument against Granting the Monopoly
One economic argument against granting to the trademark owner an
exclusive right to the use of a sports logo/symbol relies on the result of
inefficiency and inequity of the monopoly. As a result of a monopoly,
consumers pay higher prices for goods with sports logos/symbols.
Traditional economic theory posits that "monopolies tend to generate a less
than optimal allocation of resources."'142 The monopolist can also control
the quantity of goods supplied to the market and thus create an artificial
scarcity in order to establish a higher market price.143
a. Counter-Argument
In opposition to this argument, trademark owners will still face
competition from other trademark owners. If, for example, the NFL
demanded excessive royalties from its potential licensees, the licensee could
turn to the National Basketball Association. In addition, if anyone who
desired- to use the mark was allowed to, the value of the mark to others
besides the owner may be adversely affected by the nature and quantity of
use. 144
141. S. REP. No. 1 333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.S. 1274,
1274.
142. Denicola, supra note 45, at 633.
143. l
144. Id at 637.
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2. Exclusive Control of the Mark is Necessary for the Owner to
Prevent Harm to both the Owner and Consumers
a. Detriments of Unauthorized Use of a Trademark
The unauthorized use of a famous mark sometimes causes detriments
that exceed the benefit to the user. For example, the reputation of the
mark's owner may be injured if the purchaser infers that they are dealing
with the entity identified by the mark. Assuming a lack of confusion,
offensive or inappropriate use of the mark may reduce its value to both the
owner and others. 145 Also, unauthorized use on various merchandise may
lead to a saturation of the market and further decrease the value of the
mark. Such copying by junior users can result in the loss of exclusive
control for the trademark owner. Thus, if all trademarks "could be used
'ornamentally' by anyone who chooses, without control by the trademark
owner, the protection of trademarks would suffer a serious setback."'
46
Some courts implement the aesthetic functionality doctrine in an
attempt to prevent the creation of a monopoly in a useful product. 47
However, by allowing a junior user to copy an aesthetically functional
feature, a court "is not significantly decreasing the risk of a monopoly in
a useful product."' 48 Thus, "if two parties are selling the same product
at the same price, consumers may decide to purchase the more aesthetically
pleasing of the two. ' 149 In addition, "[j]unior users can choose from an
infinite number of equally pleasing designs.""15 Thus, a trademark owner
of an aesthetically pleasing design "will not be able to extract significant
monopoly profits as long as other producers can produce similar products
with different aesthetically pleasing features."''
145. Id.
146. 1 JEtOMB GILSON, TRADFMARK PROTECON AND PRACTncE § 5.05[10], at 5-109
(1994).
147. Mims, supra note 17, at 661.
148. Id.
149. Il at 661 n.113.
150. Id. at 661.
151. Id. at 661-62.
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b. Exclusive Control is Necessary by the Owner to Prevent
Unjust Enrichment by Infringers
The trademark owner can also rely on the principle of unjust
enrichment in arguing for complete control over the ornamental use of its
trademarks. The value of the mark is the result of the owner's efforts. A
demand for the collateral product would not exist unless "there were
demand for the primary product. Without the New York Yankees no one
would want a tee shirt with their logo. The tee shirt would have no
meaning. '  Thus, if that value is infringed by another, the trademark
owner has a claim to the proceeds.
153
Under an exclusive merchandising right for the owner of the mark,
licenses are issued to manufacturers in exchange for a percentage of
royalties."5 An argument exists that the public would benefit from
manufacturers, such as those in Boston Hockey and Job's Daughters, who
could enter the market without paying royalties and thus offer lower prices.
However, there is no compelling proof that such defendants would not have
charged the same prices as the other emblem manufacturers and thus
enjoyed higher profits. 55 Also, the defendants in such cases can usually
enter the market by getting a license. The licensing process is relatively
easy and requires only the payment of a royalty or modest licensing
fee.
156
c. Fairness, Equity, and Consumer Benefit Weigh
in Favor of Granting the Sports Organization
a Monopoly over its Trademark
Notions of fairness and equity militate in favor of a trademark
owner's right to prohibit others from exploiting the mark. In regard to
source or quality, the public may be indifferent as to whether a manufac-
turer of goods is an actual licensee of a sports organization. "In the long
run, however, consumers will be injured if hockey teams (and other
similarly situated licensors) are unable to obtain the full economic benefits
from the creation and exploitation of their trademarks."' 57 For example,
152. Diana Elzey Pinover, Aesthetic Functionality: The Need for a Foreclosure of
Competition, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 571, 587 (1993).
153. Denicola, supra note 45, at 640.
154. Id.
155. Bauer, supra note 88, at 731.
156. See Sobel, supra note 129, at 20.
157. Bauer, supra note 88, at 732.
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royalties from licenses may allow sports teams to charge lower ticket
prices, pay higher salaries for better players, and remain in a certain
location. 58 Sports fans thus would probably desire that revenues from
licensing went to the sports teams instead of some unrelated entity.
159
Proponents of such exclusive control argue that to "the extent that it is
expensive to create and market trademarks (and their related goods and
services), denying full exploitation of a mark to the owner will, in the long
run, result in the creation of fewer and less attractive marks and of inferior
products or services associated with those marks."'"
d. Proposed Amount of Control that Sports Organizations
Should Have Over their Trademarks
Sports organizations should have strong control over their marks.
Such control, though, should be limited to preventing an infringer from
increasing its own saleability or identifying with the sports team. Thus, the
amount of control afforded to sports organizations should be geared toward
protecting their investment in establishing the mark.
V. CONCLUSION
Sports organizations should be allowed significant control over their
marks, but that control should not be absolute. Federal trademark
protection extends to those owners who can establish a likelihood of
confusion. The use of the functionality defense should be limited to
utilitarian uses of the mark. State anti-dilution statutes provide an added
means of protection for sports organizations in the absence of a likelihood
of confusion. However, statutes such as California's must be clarified so
that protection is limited to the use of a trademark as an effort to increase
the saleability of the other product as well as identify it with the sports
organization.
The divided rationale in the case law reflects the ambiguous nature of
trademark protection for sports organizations. However, most users who
desire to use another's trademark/logo acquire a license. The licensing
branch of the sports organizations will often provide a license for use of
their mark for a reasonable royalty and a guarantee that such use is not
disparaging or detrimental to their goodwill. The sports organizations have
158. Id. at 732 n.238 (sports teams often make location or ownership changes because of
inadequate revenues).
159. Id.
160. Id.
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developed the goodwill in their logos/symbols and thus should be allowed
strong control over those logos/symbols. While the consumer may pay
slightly higher prices for goods or services which incorporate a sports
organization's logo, the additional royalty to the sports organization can be
used to enhance the quality of the team and also contribute to lower ticket
prices. Thus, allowing sports organizations to maintain strong control over
their marks benefits both the owners as well as the consumers who desire
to associate with or show allegiance to the sports teams.
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